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LOSS OF CONSORTIUM: A DERIVATIVE INJURY
GIVING RISE TO A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Evolving perceptions of the rights and duties of married persons
have required a frequent reevaluation of laws concerning marriage.'
One legal right that has undergone dramatic change is the right of a
spouse to recover when a disabling injury to the other spouse 2 results
in a loss of consortium, 3 a right deeply rooted in the early common
law. 4 In its original common-law form, the action for loss of consor-
tium was available only to a husband whose wife was injured by
another. Although recovery was historically predicated on the loss of
the wife's5 services,6 today the loss is recognized by an overwhelming
majority of states as encompassing the loss, by either spouse, 7 of the
"affection, solace, comfort, companionship, society, assistance, and
1. See H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States ch. 7
(1968) (development of legal rights of married women); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The
Law of Torts §§ 8.1-.4, 8.7, 8.9 (1956) (evolution of tort actions with respect to
marriage); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 74, at 489-90 (4th ed. 1971)
(effect of Married Women's Acts on rights of wives in tort actions); Kulzer, Law and
the Housewife: Property, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1 passim (1975)
(effect of changing ideas of marital property, divorce and property distribution at
death); Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 Fain. L.Q. 415, 421-24 (1980)
(general legal consequences of changing nature of marriage).
2. Traditionally, loss of consortium has been recognized only when it flows
from physical injuries of the disabled spouse. The Supreme Court of California,
however, has held that there can be recovery for loss of consortium resulting from the
disabled spouse's emotional injury. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,
932-33, 616 P.2d 813, 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 841 (1980) (en bane); accord Agis v.
Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 146-47, 355 N.E.2d 315, 319-20 (1976).
3. Unintentional deprivation of consortium, resulting from an injury to one
spouse, is referred to as loss of consortium. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at
889. Intentional deprivation of consortium is referred to as alienation of affections.
See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 124, at 878.
4. See Birmingham S. Ry. v. Lintner, 141 Ala. 420, 427-28, 38 So. 363, 365
(1904); Ohio & M. Ry. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32, 34-35, 7 N.E. 373, 375 (1886); Mallett
v. Dunn, [1949] 2 K.B. 180, 183-85; Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1619); W.
Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 888-89.
5. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 635, 639; W. Prosser,
supra note 1, § 125, at 889, 894; see, e.g., Birmingham S. Ry. v. Lintner, 141 Ala.
420, 427, 38 So. 363, 365 (1904); Ohio & M. Ry. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32, 34-35, 7 N.E.
373, 375 (1886).
6. 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 638; see W. Prosser, supra
note 1, § 125, at 889-90.
7. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 895. Prosser stated in 1971 that a
majority of courts that considered the question had extended the right to recover for
loss of consortium. Id. Since his 1971 edition, additional states have followed. E.g.,
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 408, 525 P.2d 669, 686, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 782 (1974) (en banc); Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 176 Conn. 485,
496, 408 A.2d 260, 265 (1979); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167-68, 302
N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973).
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sexual relations necessary to a successful marriage."" It is also now
generally recognized that loss of consortium is a separate injury of the
loss of consortium spouse.9
Consistent with the archaic belief that the husband and wife are a
legal unity' 0 rather than distinct entities, however, the modern action
is frequently characterized as derivative 1I or is treated as an action for
8. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978); accord Schreiner v.
Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 382, 404-05, 525 P.2d 669, 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974) (en banc);
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator
Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968).
Recovery for loss of consortium may be substantial. See Rodriguez v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 652, 663-64, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 413, 419-20
(1978) (award of $500,000 for loss of consortium was held to be not excessive where
spouse, at the age of 22 and married 16 months, was rendered a triplegic, and the
other spouse claiming the loss of consortium was 20); Rocha v. State, 77 Misc. 2d
290, 301-02, 352 N.Y.S.2d 990, 1003 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ($50,000 award to spouse, 28
years old at the time of the accident, who had no sexual relations with disabled
spouse since the accident and probably never would), af'd, 45 A.D.2d 633, 360
N.Y.S.2d 484 (1975); Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 137-38, 201 N.W.2d
580, 585 (1972) ($15,000 award to husband whose wife, since an accident, refused to
do housework or to have sexual relations). Loss of consortium is a separate injury
which must be separately proved. Washington v. Jones, 386 Mich. 466, 472-73, 192
N.W.2d 234, 237 (1971) (evidence of personal injuries of spouse does not constitute
evidence of loss of consortium, and mere averment of loss of consortium does not
suffice as basis of awarding relief). Furthermore, all elements of loss of consortium
need not be suffered to warrant relief. See, e.g., Ricker v. Zinser Textilmaschinen
GmbH, 506 F. Supp. 3, 8 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1980)
(spouse deprived of his wife's services of doing housework and assisting with farm
work awarded $1800 notwithstanding lack of evidence of defendant's negligence
causing deprivation of sexual relations).
9. See, e.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974) (loss of
consortium is a personal loss); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d
498, 504-05, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1968) ("consortium
now represents the interest of the injured party's spouse"). The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, permitting a wife to assert her loss of consortium claim separately from
her husband's personal injury claim, noted that "her claim is not for his personal
injuries but for the separate and independent loss she sustained." Fitzgerald v.
Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 581, 157 N.W.2d 595, 600 (1968).
10. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *442; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at
859-60. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband .... " 1 W. Blackstone,
supra, at *442 (footnotes omitted).
11. E.g., Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1961); Allen v. Endru-
kaitis, 35 Conn. Supp. 286, 290-91, 408 A.2d 673, 675 (1979); Hamm v. City of
Milton, 358 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Anderson v. Lutheran
Deaconess Hosp., 257 N.W.2d 561, 562 n.1 (Minn. 1977); Maidman v. Stagg, 82
A.D.2d 299, 305-06, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d
563, 574-76, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975).
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injury to the marriage. '2 These characterizations are offered as justifi-
cation for applying to the loss of consortium action substantive and
procedural laws applicable to the action of the disabled spouse.' 3
Similarly, because the married couple is viewed by some courts as an
economic entity, recovery of the loss of consortium spouse is dimin-
ished or denied if there is contributory negligence on the part of the
disabled spouse. 14
This Note contends that although the loss of consortium injury is
derivative, the action is not. It criticizes the practice of imputing the
negligence of the disabled spouse to the loss of consortium spouse. It
further argues that the other justifications offered for this practice-
that the injury is to the marriage rather than to the affected spouse or
that the married couple is an economic entity-are inconsistent with
the modern view of marriage. This Note similarly criticizes the prac-
tice of mechanically applying the procedural rules attendant to the
disabling injury action to the loss of consortium action. The courts are
urged to acknowledge modern realities and apply substantive and
procedural laws consistent with the separate nature of the loss of
consortium injury and action.
I. NATURE OF Loss OF CONSORTIUM
A. Development of Loss of Consortium
At early common law, loss of consortium primarily compensated
the husband for the loss of material services of the wife. 15 Because the
husband and wife were deemed one person with all rights vested in
the husband,' 6 the wife had no enforceable right to the material
12. Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); see Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 504-05, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1968); infra pt. I1(B).
13. E.g., Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1961); Eggert v.
Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Supp.
286, 290, 408 A.2d 67.3, 675 (1979); Anderson v. Lutheran Deaconess Hosp., 257
N.W.2d 561, 562 n.1 (Minn. 1977); Maidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d 299, 305-06, 441
N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442,
449 (1975).
14. See Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Ross v. Cuthbert,
239 Or. 429, 435-37, 397 P.2d 529, 532 (1964) (en banc).
15. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 1341, 1343-44 (1961); see, e.g., Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 83-84, 162
S.W. 280, 286-87 (1913); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 405, 55 S.E. 778, 781
(1906); Standen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 214 Pa. 189, 198-200, 63 A. 467, 470-71
(1906). The term "services" often included the wife's services both inside and outside
the home. See Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's Services (pt. 1), 38 Harv. L. Rev.
421, 421 (1925). Even today, it is not always clear what elements are considered part
of loss of consortium. See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 292-93,
195 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1972).
16. 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 10, at *442; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at
859-60. The husband and wife were legally identified with each other, and therefore
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services of her spouse,1 7 and her loss of the husband's consortium was
not a compensable injury.'8
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century,' statutes known as Married
Women's Acts, 0 which have now been passed in all states,2' abolished
the husband was liable for the wife's torts. E.g., Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273,
274, 70 P. 21, 22 (1902); Missio v. Williams, 129 Tenn. 504, 509-10, 167 S.W. 473,
474 (1914). Consistent with deeming the husband the owner of the wife's property,
however, the wife was not liable for the husband's torts. See, e.g., Vanneman v.
Powers, 56 N.Y. 39, 42-43 (1874); Longey v. Leach, 57 Vt. 377, 379 (1885). This
legal unity prevented the husband and wife from suing each other. See, e.g., Libby
v. Berry, 74 Me. 286, 288 (1883); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1865); Howe v. Blanden, 21 Vt. 315, 321 (1849). To some extent, the Married
Women's Acts have been used to justify abrogation of this interspousal immunity.
E.g., Notes v. Snyder, 4 F.2d 426, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga.
App. 251, 252-55, 103 S.E.2d 134, 135-37 (1958); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197
Va. 216, 222-23, 89 S.E.2d 69, 74-76 (1955). See generally W. Prosser, supra note 1,
§ 122, at 861-64 (discussion of reasons advanced by courts to recognize or deny a
cause of action for torts between spouses); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1050-56 (1930) (same). Upon marrying,
the wife lost many rights. She generally could not bring suit without joining her
husband. E.g., Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323, 323-24 (1861); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54
Me. 156, 160 (1866). Also, the husband could use the wife's property as he pleased.
See, e.g., Ellington v. Harris, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S.E. 134 (1906); Jones v. Patterson, 11
Barb. 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1852). The husband could obtain a judgment for all
damages resulting from an injury to the wife. See XV. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at
860; see, e.g., Little v. Marsh, 37 N.C. 18, 27, 2 Ired. Eq. 8, 15 (1841); Tritt's Adm'r
v. Colwell's Adm'r, 31 Pa. (7 Casey) 228, 232-33 (1858).
17. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 665
(1930); see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 812-15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d
220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
18. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 635, 639; V. Prosser,
supra note 1, § 125, at 889, 894; see, e.g., Birmingham S. Ry. v. Lintner, 141 Ala.
420, 427, 38 So. 363, 365 (1904); Ohio & M. Ry. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32, 34-35, 7 N.E.
373, 375 (1886). All elements of the loss either gave rise to a derivative right of the
husband to recover on behalf of the wife or a right of the husband to sue based on an
injury to the marital entity. Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,184 Mich. 304, 312, 151
N.W. 724, 727 (1915) (the husband had the right to the "'labor, services, and earnings
of his wife"), overruled, Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227
(1960); see Hannigan, Damages Recoverable by Husband for ijury to Wife, 16
Colum. L. Rev. 122, 124-25 (1916); Lippman, supra note 17, at 653. "The husband
was allowed to sue for loss of consortium both because of the wife's status as a chattel
of her husband, and because of her inability to bring suit in her own behalf for
injuries she sustained." Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 463 (Alaska 1974) (footnote
omitted).
19. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at 861.
20. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 5112 (Vest 1970) (concurring negligence of
spouse not defense unless it would be "if the marriage did not exist"); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 209, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) (married women can own and control
property); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2001 (1981) (married women can bring
suit without joining their husbands); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-301(2) (McKinney
1978) (married women may recover for their own injuries). Each spouse is liable only
for his or her own torts. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Slaughter, 122 Ga. App. 374, 376, 177
1982] 1347
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the fiction of marital unity. The recognition that the husband and
wife had separate rights required a reevaluation of the nature of loss
of consortium to assure proper allocation of recovery between the
spouses.2 2 Because the wife now had a right to recover for her own
lost services, a few courts abrogated the cause of action. 23  They
reasoned that loss of consortium had been essentially an economic loss
and rejected the argument that the emotional elements of the loss
were worthy of redress. 24 Most courts, however, continued to recog-
nize consortium as a compensable right because they deemed the
emotional elements worthy of protection.25 Nevertheless, they refused
S.E.2d 119, 121 (1970); McClure v. McMartin, 104 La. 496, 507, 29 So. 227, 231-32
(1901).
21. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at 861; see 3 C. Vernier, American Family
Laws § 167 (1935) (wife's property); id. § 179 (wife as a party in litigation); id. § 180
(litigation between husband and wife).
22. See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 155-56, 302 N.E.2d 555, 557
(1973). "To be sure, loss of the wife's services or earnings could no longer figure in a
right of consortium on the part of the husband, but the other components of the
right-the wife's society or companionship or assistance and her sexual availability-
could remain." Id.; see Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6-8 (1923).
23. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 891; e.g., Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84
Conn. 9, 22-24, 78 A. 582, 586-87 (1911), overruled, Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp.,
176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304,
314, 151 N.W. 724, 727 (1915), overruled, Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33,
101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); see 1. F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 638-39.
The highest court of Connecticut, abrogating the husband's right to recover for loss
of consortium, reasoned that because Connecticut's Married Women's Act granted
the wife the right to enforce her own rights and because the husband's loss of
consortium claim was "essentially grounded . . . in the impairment of the wife's
capacity for service and usefulness," there was no longer a claim for loss of consor-
tium. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 23, 78 A. 582, 586 (1911), overruled,
Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979).
24. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 23-24, 78 A. 582, 586-87 (1911),
overruled, Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979). "[T]he
law has never undertaken any such investigations, has never countenanced any
attempt to measure pecuniarily such a loss, and, as we have seen, has never recog-
nized in the mere impairment of conjugal relations, pure and simple, the foundation
of a right of action." Id. at 23-24, 78 A. at 587. The court refused to distinguish
between the wife's services rendered inside the home and those rendered outside the
home. Id. at 23, 78 A. at 586-87.
25. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 891. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
recently reversed itself and now recognizes loss of consortium. Hopson v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 496, 408 A.2d 260, 265 (1979). Recovery for loss of the wife's
services was often included as part of the loss. E.g., People's Home Tel. Co. v.
Cockrum, 182 Ala. 547, 550, 62 So. 86, 87 (1913); Hansen v. Costello, 125 Conn.
386, 389, 5 A.2d 880, 882 (1939). But see Glanville v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 196
Iowa 456, 464, 193 N.W. 548, 551-52 (1923) (statute providing that wife can recover
for loss of her time included the value of domestic services). The wife's earnings
outside the home belong to her. E.g., Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 155,
302 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1973); Standen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 214 Pa. 189, 199, 63 A.
467, 470 (1906). The nature of loss of consortium had changed, therefore, from being
primarily an economic injury, to being primarily an emotional injury. See Acuff v.
1348 [Vol. 50
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to extend this right to the wife26 until 1950, when the District of
Columbia Circuit decided Hitaffer v. Argonne Company.2 7  The
Hitaffer court recognized that "[i]nvasion of the consortium is an
independent wrong directly to the spouse so injured."s The court
Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 274, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1956); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
364 Mass. 153, 155, 302 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1973); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator
Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 507, 239 N.E.2d 897, 902, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 311 (1968):
Martin, Torts, 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 555, 592-93 (1979); Judicial Treatment of Negli-
gent Invasion of Consortium, supra note 15, at 1343-44.
26. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 894-95; e.g., Giggey v. Gallagher Transp.
Co., 101 Colo. 258, 261, 72 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (1937); Gambino v. Manufacturers
Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 658-59, 158 S.V. 77, 79 (1913). overruled,
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, 365 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Mo. 1963) (en banc); Goldman
v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 337, 63 N.Y.S. 459, 459-60 (1900). It is interesting that at
common law, although the wife was denied the right to sue for loss of consortium,
she probably could have recovered for alienation of affections. See, e.g., Hoover v.
Hoover, 103 Fla. 846, 847, 138 So. 373, 374 (1931) (en banc); Norris v. Stoneham, 46
S.W.2d 363, 363-64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Newsom v. Fleming, 165 Va. 89, 92-93,
181 S.E. 393, 395-96 (1935); Domestic Relations-Right of Wife to Sue for Loss of
Consortium Due to a Negligent Injury to Her Husband, 35 Ky. L.J. 220, 221-22
(1947). One reason proffered for not permitting the wife the right to sue for loss of
consortium is that at common law she lacked capacity to bring suit to obtain redress.
Holbrook, supra note 22, at 2. Because the Married Women's Acts permitted the wife
to bring suit, it would have been expected that courts would recognize the wife's
right to bring a loss of consortium action. Another reason proffered, however, is that
she simply did not have the same rights as the husband. Id. Blackstone has descrip-
tively accounted for this reason: "We may observe that in these relative injuries
notice is only taken of the wrong done to the superior of the parties related... while
the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded." 2 W. Blackstone, supra
note 10, at *142.
27. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on
other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 914 (1957). The Supreme Court of North Carolina had been the first court to
permit the wife to recover for loss of consortium, but temporarily overruled itself.
Hipp v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 15-17, 108 S.E. 318, 323
(1921), overruled, Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 128, 126 S.E.
307, 312 (1925), overruled, Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C.
295, 300-04, 266 S.E.2d 818, 821-23 (1980). In 1945, the North Carolina court also
denied the cause of action to the husband. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C.
821, 824, 32 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1945), overruled, Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memo-
rial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 300-04, 266 S.E.2d 818, 821-23 (1980). In 1980, this court,
overruling Hinnant and Helmstetler, recognized loss of consortium for either the wife
or husband. Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 300-04,
266 S.E.2d 818, 821-23 (1980).
28. 183 F.2d at 815. "[A]fter piercing the thin veils of reasoning employed to
sustain the rule, we have been unable to disclose any substantial rationale on which
we would be willing to predicate a denial of a wife's action for loss of consortium due
to a negligent injury to her husband." Id. at 813; accord Swartz v. United States Steel
Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 441-46, 304 So. 2d 881, 882-87 (1974); Schreiner v. Fruit, 519
P.2d 462, 464-66 (Alaska 1974); cf. American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274,
284-85 (1980) (wife can recover under general maritime law for loss of husband's
society caused by non-fatal injury).
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found no merit in the argument that because loss of material services is
the primary element of loss of consortium, the wife, who had no legal
right to the husband's material services, had no cause of action. 20 The
Hitaffer court reasoned that loss of services is only one element 0 of the
"conceptualistic unity" 31 that comprises loss of consortium. The court
recognized that "[t]he medieval concepts of the marriage relation to
which other jurisdictions ha[d] reverted in order to (deny the wife's
action] ha[d] long since ceased to have any meaning. '3 2  Today,
almost all states have adopted the Hitaffer rationale and recognize loss
of consortium as a cause of action available to either spouse. 33
29. 183 F.2d at 813. "The difficulty with adhering to these authorities is that
they sound in the false premise that in these actions the loss of services is the
predominant factor." Id.
30. Id. Deeming loss of services the predominant factor of loss of consortium "is
nothing more than an arbitrary separation of the various elements of consortium
devised to circumvent the logic of allowing the wife such an action." Id.
31. Id. at 814. "it is not the fact that one or the other of the elements of
consortium is injured in a particular invasion that controls the type of action which
may be brought but rather that the consortium as such has been injured at all." Id.;
see Aderhold v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 77, 78, 46 P.2d 346, 348 (1935) (per curiam); D.
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 8.11, at 587-88 (1973).
32. 183 F.2d at 819; see W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 894-95.
33. See supra note 7. In some states, the legislature has extended the right to sue
for loss of consortium to the wife. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 15 (West 1976); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-75-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-1-106 (1980); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5431 (Supp. 1981). In Virginia, instead of extending this right to
the wife, the legislature removed it from the husband. See Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d
772, 776 (4th Cir. 1965) (construing Va. Code § 55-36 (1950)). When courts extended
the right to sue for loss of consortium to the wife, they justified this extension as a
consequence of the separate right of the wife to consortium and the separate personal
harm suffered by the loss of consortium spouse. E.g., Swartz v. United States Steel
Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 446, 304 So. 2d 881, 887 (1974) (because each spouse has a
personal interest in the maintenance of the marriage relationship, an injury to the
relationship is a separate injury to each spouse); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass.
153, 165, 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (1973) ("marital interest is quite recognizable and its
impairment may be definite, serious, and enduring"). The early common-law prac-
tice of allowing the husband, but not the wife, to sue for loss of consortium raises the
issue of equal protection of law. The Tenth Circuit granted recovery to a wife before
the effective date of Oklahoma's statute extending loss of consortium to the wife
because it found Oklahoma's practice of recognizing only the husband's loss to be a
violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Duncan v.
General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1974). "The intangible segments
of the elements comprising the cause of action for loss of consortium are equally
precious to both husband and wife." Id. Utah has overcome any equal protection
problem by denying loss of consortium recovery to both spouses. Tjas v. Proctor, 591
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979); Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 144, 493 P.2d 985,
986 (1972); Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1953). A few states continue the discriminatory
practice of granting the husband, but not the wife, the right to recover for loss of
consortium. Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 218, 387 P.2d 321, 326-27 (1963);
Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347, 348-49 (Wyo. 1971). See generally Torts in the
Family (pt. a), 32 J. Am. Trial Law. A. 265 (1968) (fourteenth amendment violated
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B. Derivative Causes of Action
Today, many states deem loss of consortium a derivative cause of
action-that is, derivative of the cause of action of the disabled
spouse. 34  Although there is no precise definition of a derivative
action, 35 it is generally an action that owes its existence to a preceding
cause of action 36 and is often no more than a separate right to enforce
the preceding claim. 37 In a shareholders' derivative suit, 3 for exam-
ple, only the corporation is injured; shareholders bring a derivative
suit to seek redress of the corporation's injury.39 The shareholders' suit
is contingent on the corporation's having an enforceable cause of
action,40 and recovery in the suit generally accrues to the corpora-
tion. 41 Similarly, if an insurance company pays a claim of its insured,
the company is subrogated to the position of the insured and can bring
when only the husband can recover for loss of consortium); Comment, Equal Protec-
tion: The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 510 (1968) (same).
34. E.g., Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975). The loss
of consortium spouse's "right to recover is derived, both in a literal and legal sense,
from the injury suffered by her spouse." Maidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d 299, 305, 441
N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981); see 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 640.
35. 16 G. Couch, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 61:37 (2d ed. 1966)
("right of subrogation is purely derivative as the insurer succeeds only to the rights of
the insured"); 3B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 23.1.16[1], at 23.1-47 (2d ed.
1981) (derivative suits "are those which seek to enforce any right which belongs to the
corporation"). Black's Law Dictionary defines "derivative" as -[e]oming from an-
other; taken from something preceding; secondary. That which has not its origin in
itself, but owes its existence to something foregoing. Anything obtained or deduced
from another." Black's Law Dictionary 399 (5th ed. 1979).
36. See 16 G. Couch, supra note 35, § 61:37; 3B J. Moore, supra note 35,
23.1.16[11], at 23.1-47.
37. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684, 686 (D.C. 1976)
(insurance company is subrogated to position of insured); 16 C. Couch, supra note
35, § 61:37 ("no new cause of action is created" (footnote omitted)); 3B J. Moore,
supra note 35, 23.1.16[1], at 23.1-39 (derivative rights are secondary in nature).
38. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. "[A] derivative action [may be] brought by one or
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorpo-
rated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right
which may properly be asserted by it .... ." Id.
39. See, e.g., Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 &
n.2 (1947); Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1024 (1976).
40. Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1939); see
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077
(1972).
41. 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1821, at 294
(1972); see Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 1003 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1024 (1976).
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a suit 42 seeking the remedies the insured could have sought had he
brought suit. 43
Loss of consortium is derivative in a different sense."4 As in the
shareholders' derivative suit or the insurance suit, the plaintiff's action
is dependent on the occurrence of an injury to another. Unlike the
shareholders or insurance company, however, the loss of consortium
spouse suffers an original injury that is the subject of the action; 45 the
shareholders can assert only the right that the corporation could have
asserted had it sued,46 and the insurance company can assert only the
right of the insured. 47
42. See, e.g., Williams v. Globe Indem. Co., 507 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151
Ind. App. 99, 106, 278 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1972); 16 G. Couch, supra note 35,
§ 61:4.
43. American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind. App. 99, 106, 278 N.E.2d
295, 300 (1972). "[T]he insurer stands in the shoes of the insured." Id.; see 16 G.
Couch, supra note 35, § 61:9.
44. Because personal injury to one spouse is a prerequisite to loss of consortium,
loss of consortium is dependent on the initial injuries. See, e.g., Lantis v. Condon, 95
Cal. App. 3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979); Utecht v. Steinagel, 54 Wis. 2d
507, 515-17, 196 N.W.2d 674, 679-80 (1972). The more severe the personal injuries
are, the more severe the loss of consortium is likely to be. Compare Rodriguez v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 663-64, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 419-20
(1979) (jury awarded $4,239,996 to personal injury spouse and $500,000 to loss of
consortium spouse), with Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 685
(D.N.H. 1972) ($105,000 award, exclusive of reduction for contributory negligence,
to personal injury spouse and $1000 to loss of consortium spouse).
45. Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 532 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd
mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980). "[An] action against
a tortfeasor for loss of consortium is an action for damages to her own interest, not a
remote consequence of the tortfeasor's injury to the husband." Id. (citation omitted);
accord Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 431, 28 N.W.2d 530, 537-38 (1947). Contra
Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Supp. 286, 291, 408 A.2d 673, 675 (Super. Ct. 1979).
A claim for the loss of a child's services and society is similar to the loss of consortium
action in that the parent, like the loss of consortium spouse, suffers a separate Injury
flowing from disabling injuries. See Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 575
(Iowa 1974). The difference between an action for derivative injuries and a purely
derivative action can be demonstrated by a comparison of wrongful death and
survival actions. "[A] distinction exists between a survival action which preserves
after death a purely derivative right through decedent for his damages, and a
wrongful death action which creates an independent right in designated survivors for
damages they sustain by reason of decedent's death." Fisher v. Missoula White Pine
Sash Co., 164 Mont. 41, 45-46, 518 P.2d 795, 797 (1974).
46. E.g., Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 265 F.2d 227, 233 (10th Cir. 1959);
Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1939); see 3B J.
Moore, supra note 35, 23.1.16[1], at 23.1-41, -47.
47. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684, 686 (D.C.
1976); American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind. App. 99, 106, 278 N.E.2d 295,
300 (1972); 16 G. Couch, supra note 35, § 61:36, at 261-62; 3 J. Moore, supra note
35, 14.09, at 14-248; cf. J. Calamar & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 18-16 (2d
ed. 1977) (assignee is in same position as assignor).
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As a general rule, therefore, the shareholder or insurance company
cannot maintain a position superior to that of the holders of the
primary cause of action: 48 The plaintiff in the derivative action, suing
for the same injury, will be awarded only that which the holder of the
primary cause of action would have received had he brought suit. 49 In
addition, any defect in the primary cause of action will be imputed to
the derivative action.50 Moreover, procedure applicable to the pri-
mary cause of action is generally applied to the derivative cause of
action.51 The loss of consortium spouse, however, asserts a separate
right; 5 2 the injury rather than the claim is derivative. The rights of the
loss of consortium spouse, therefore, should not be restricted by, or
contingent on, the rights of the disabled spouse.5 3
Some courts, apparently, are confused by this distinction. Such
confusion is most evident in their treatment of loss of consortium as a
48. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); American States Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 151 Ind. App. 99, 106, 278 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1972). This is similar to the
general rule that an assignee's right cannot have a position superior to the corres-
ponding assignor's right. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 47, § 18-16
(generally, defenses applicable to the assignor are also applicable to the assignee).
The assignment theory has been held applicable to loss of consortium. Stuart v.
Winnie, 217 Wis. 298, 305, 258 N.W. 611, 614 (1935). Under this theory, all defenses
against the disabled spouse are also applicable against the loss of consortium spouse.
Id. The problem with applying the assignment theory to loss of consortium is that it
violates a basic principle of assignment: One cannot assign what one does not have.
The disabled spouse does not have the right to sue for loss for consortium. See
Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 195 N.W.2d 480, 484-85
(1972).
49. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Niles v. New York Cent. &
Hudson River R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 126, 68 N.E. 142, 145 (1903). An insurance
company, however, generally cannot receive an amount in excess of that which it
paid to the insured. 16 G. Couch, supra note 35, § 61:39, at 263.
50. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684, 685 (D.C.
1976); American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind. App. 99, 106, 278 N.E.2d 295,
300 (1972).
51. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684, 685 (D.C.
1976); W. Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors § 14.01, at 375-76
(2d ed. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974); Lantis v.
Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979); Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 504-05, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1968); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571,
581, 157 N.W.2d 595, 600 (1968).
53. See Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); Lantis v.
Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (1979); Bartalo v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533, 124 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374-75 (1975); Fuller
v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421
N.E.2d 67, 70-71 (Mass. 1981); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss. 611, 623-24,




derivative action for the purpose of attributing the negligence of the
disabled spouse to the loss of consortium spouse and as non-derivative
for procedural purposes. 4
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DisABLE SPOUSE
A. Deeming the Action Derivative
In most jurisdictions, the contributory negligence of the disabled
spouse is attributed to the loss of consortium spouse to either reduce or
bar recovery.5 5 Because the husband and wife are no longer legally
54. Compare Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1971) (action is derivative
for purpose of contributory negligence of the disabled spouse), and Tjaden v. Moses,
94 Ill. App. 2d 361, 365, 237 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1968) (loss of consortium action Is
dependent upon third party's liability to the personal injury spouse), and White v.
Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975) (loss of consortium Is a
derivative action for purpose of reducing or barring award by contributory negli-
gence of disabled spouse), with Daniels v. Weiss, 385 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (amendment to pleadings to add the separate loss of consortium action
could not relate back), and Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 Ill. 2d 159, 163, 317
N.E.2d 505, 507 (1974) (the separate loss of consortium action is not governed by the
statute of limitations that governs the action of the disabled spouse), and Schwartz v.
City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 195 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1972) (loss of
consortium is a separate cause of action not to be added to personal injuries damages
in ascertaining statutory amount). Although the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
loss of consortium spouse's action was not derivative and therefore was neither barred
by the adverse adjudication nor governed by the statute of limitations of the claim of
the disabled spouse, it noted that contributory negligence of the disabled spouse
would be a defense to an action by the loss of consortium spouse. Kraut v. Cleveland
Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936).
55. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 892; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §
494 (1965 & app. 1966). Some cases limit recovery because loss of consortium has
been designated derivative. E.g., Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 254-55, 437 S.W.2d
799, 803 (1969); Hamni v. City of Milton, 358 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 513, 170 N.W.2d 865, 869
(1969); Maidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d 299, 305, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981).
Recovery has also been limited because of an archaic view of loss of consortium as an
injury to the marriage. See Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979).
The "well-settled rule" theory, which favors precedent over policy, has apparently
provided solace for some courts in limiting recovery. See Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or.
429, 435-36, 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964) (en bane). Many commentators have
opposed the attribution of contributory negligence. E.g., Gilmore, Imputed Negli-
gence (pt. 1), 1 Wis. L. Rev. 193, 213-14 (1921); Gregory, The Contributory Negli-
gence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, Etc., 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 173, 173-74 (1935); 11 Wayne L. Rev. 824, 825 (1965). In at least four
jurisdictions, the contributory negligence of one spouse will not affect the loss of
consortium award of the other. Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1977) (construing New Hampshire law); Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152,
155-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa
1980); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (Mass. 1981); cf. Hande-
land v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 578-79 (Iowa 1974) (child's contributory negligence
no bar to parental suit).
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identified as a unit in non-consortium cases, its general use has been
severely criticized for defeating recovery on the basis of a fictitious
agency 56 and its use, in these same jurisdictions, is quite limited
today.57 Since the enactment of the Married Women's Acts, marriage
is no longer deemed a sufficient nexus to impute the contributory
negligence of one spouse to the other.ss Thus, if a husband and wife
are in an automobile accident with a third party, and the negligence
of one spouse contributes to the personal injuries or property damage
of the other, the marriage relationship will not serve as a basis for
imputing negligence: The injured spouse can recover fully from the
third-party defendant. 59
Nonetheless, the loss of consortium spouse's award is often reduced
or barred because of the contributory negligence of the disabled
spouse.6 0 Although rejecting the applicability of the doctrine of im-
56. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 488; accord Dashiell v. Keauhou-Kona
Co., 487 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1973). "[A]pplying the concept of imputed contribu-
tory negligence . . . would needlessly frustrate some basic policies of tort law.
[Plaintiff] was found by the jury to be blameless, and since negligence law is based on
personal fault, it would be both illogical and inequitable to deny him recovery ....
[I]n fact, application of the imputed contributory negligence rule would have the
opposite effect of freeing from liability another party who is at fault even though the
person denied recovery is blameless." Id.; accord Lessler, The Proposed Discard of
the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 156, 175
(1951); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 485 comment b (1965).
57. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 488. "Except for vestigial remnants which
are at most moribund historical survivals, 'imputed contributory negligence' in its
own right has now disappeared. The result at which the courts have arrived is that
the plaintiff will never be barred from recovery by the negligence of a third person
unless the relation between them is such that the plaintiff would be vicariously liable
as a defendant to another who might be injured." Id. (footnote omitted).
58. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 489-90, § 123, at 869-71; see Gilmore,
supra note 55, at 202-05; cf. Lewis v. Till, 395 So. 2d 737, 738-39 (La. 1981) (wife's
contributory negligence in causing death of 18-month-old son not imputed to hus-
band). But cf. Stull v. Ragsdale, 620 S.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Ark. 1981) (wife's contrib-
utory negligence in causing death to four-year-old daughter imputed to husband).
Contributory negligence can properly be imputed today if a sufficient nexus exists
between the husband and wife independent of the marriage. See, e.g., Hover v.
Clamp, 40 Colo. App. 410, 412, 579 P.2d 1181, 1183 (1978) (contributory negligence
of husband imputed to wife because the husband was driving automobile owned by
the wife).
59. E.g., Dunham v. Kampman, 37 Colo. App. 233, 236, 547 P.2d 263, 266
(1975), aff'd en banc, 192 Colo. 448, 560 P.2d 91 (1977); Anding v. Southwestern
Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 690, 696 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489,
497, 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954); see W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 490.
60. E.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Nelson v.
Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 254-55, 437 S.W.2d 799, 803 (1969); Maidman v. Stagg, 82
A.D.2d 299, 306-07, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (1981); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429,
436-37, 397 P.2d 529, 532 (1964) (en banc); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 494
(1965 & app. 1966); supra note 55.
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puted contributory negligence in such cases, 81 a number of courts
deem the reduction a necessary consequence of the derivative nature
of loss of consortium.6 2 The distinction, however, is purely seman-
tic. 63 As one court has noted, "[rieduced to its bare essentials, the only
real effect of holding that [the loss of consortium] action is 'derivative'
would be to resurrect under a different name the doctrine of imputed
negligence." 6 4 Whether the reduction results from the alleged "deriv-
ative" nature of the action or from the doctrine of imputed contribu-
tory negligence, the resulting diminution of recovery, and the under-
lying reason, the contributory negligence of the disabled spouse, are
identical. Notwithstanding the derivative nature of the loss of consor-
tium injury, the separate action, brought by and on behalf of the
separately injured loss of consortium spouse, should be judged on its
own merits.
B. Deeming the Injury as One to the Marriage
Some courts similarly evade the imputation of contributory negli-
gence issue by deeming loss of consortium an injury to the marriage
relationship.6 5 Because the injury is to the marriage, the fault of
either party to the relationship is treated as relevant to recovery.00
The Supreme Court of Alaska, for example, reducing a loss of consor-
61. Maidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d 299, 306 n.*, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 n.*
(1981); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 485 comments a-c, at 541-42 (1965); id. §
487; W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 489-90.
62. See Maidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d 299, 302-06, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713-15
(1981); accord Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1971); Tjaden v. Moses, 94 Ill.
App. 2d 361, 365, 237 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1968); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563,
574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975). When the New York Court of Appeals extended
the right to recover for loss of consortium to the wife, it noted that "[t]o describe the
loss as 'indirect' is only to evade the issue." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.,
22 N.Y.2d 498, 503, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968). It is
curious, therefore, that when a New York appellate court reduced recovery for loss of
consortium by the contributory negligence of the initially injured spouse, it relied on
its characterization of loss of consortium as an indirect injury. Maidman v. Stagg, 82
A.D.2d 299, 305, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981).
63. See Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee, 54 Wis. 2d 286, 293-94, 195 N.W.2d
480, 484-85 (1972); 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 640; 11 Wayne L.
Rev. 824, 825 (1965).
64. Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979);
accord 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 1, § 8.9, at 640. California has abolished
the doctrine of imputing contributory negligence solely on the basis of the marital
relationship. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 155-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §
5112 (West 1970)).
65. See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974); Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 504-05, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1968).
66. Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Maidman v. Stagg,
82 A.D.2d 299, 306, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (1981).
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tium award because of the contributory negligence of the disabled
spouse, 7 paradoxically reasoned:
The fact that each spouse is equal and independent and suffers a
personal loss when the other is injured, does not alter the fact that
the basis for recovery for loss of consortium is "interference with
the continuance of a healthy and happy marital life" and "injury to
the conjugal relation. '6
The view of consortium as an injury to the marital relationship 9 is
a poorly reasoned relic of early common law. The legal fiction of the
unity of the husband and wife no longer exists.70 Consortium is each
spouse's separate right to enjoyment of the marital relationship. 7'
Loss of consortium is a distinguishable and separate injury of one
spouse72 and should be unaffected by the contributory negligence of
the other spouse.
C. Deeming the Married Couple an Economic Entity
Some courts, focusing on economic consequences, reduce or bar
recovery for loss of consortium to prevent conversion of the fruits of
the negligent conduct of the disabled spouse into a "financial recoup-
ment for the family exchequer."' 73 The family exchequer, however,
67. Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979).
68. Id. (quoting Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465-66 (Alaska 1974); Mil-
lington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 505, 239 N.E.2d 897, 900, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305, 310 (1968)).
69. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 504-05, 239 N.E.2d
897, 900, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 309-10 (1968). "Once it is recognized that consortium
now represents the interest of the injured party's spouse in the continuance of a
healthy and happy marital life and that the cause of action seeks to compensate for
the injury to that relationship, it becomes evident that the cause of action is not a
relic." Id. (emphasis added). Although the court recognized the individual interest in
consortium of either spouse, it considered the purpose of recovery to be the rectifica-
tion of the injury to the relationship. Because the interest is an individual one,
however, injury to that interest is likewise individual. See supra note 52 and accom-
panying text.
70. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
71. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d
220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957). In extending the right to recover
for loss of consortium to the wife, the court noted "that the husband and the wife
have equal rights in the marriage relation which will receive equal protection of the
law." Id.
72. See Ballard v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 612, 148
N.W.2d 65, 71-72 (1967). In Ballard, an injured woman was allowed recovery for
her loss of enjoyment of playing golf and her spouse was granted a separate award for
loss of consortium that included loss of his wife's companionship in playing golf. Id.
The loss of consortium award was only for the separate injury sustained by the spouse
who lost the companionship. Id.; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 436, 397 P.2d 529, 532 (1964) (en bane); see
White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574-75, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1975).
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may not in fact exist. 74 If the husband and wife do not share funds,
the disabled spouse does not profit from his negligence and, if recov-
ery is fully or partially denied, the loss of consortium spouse is unjustly
deprived.75
Furthermore, if the basis for limiting recovery is that the husband
and wife are an economic unit, this limitation should apply regardless
of the nature of the injury. Yet, the contributory negligence of a
spouse is usually not attributed to the other s.pouse if recovery is for
injuries other than loss of consortium. 78  Allowing full recovery for
other injuries, while reducing or barring the loss of consortium award
under the auspices of preventing a windfall recovery, disregards that
both types of awards are equally available to the negligent spouse.
Because the loss of consortium spouse cannot directly sue the dis-
abled spouse, 77 some courts that focus on economic consequences
74. See Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216 (Nov. 13, 1981) (avail-
able on LEXIS, States library, Mass file) (antenuptial agreement providing for
finances.
75. See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (Mass. 1981). If loss of
consortium recovery is limited by the disabled spouse's contributory negligence, the
loss of consortium spouse is unjustly deprived because he was not personally at fault.
Id.; cf. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 9.1, at 253-
54 (1968) (one spouse should not be prevented from suing the other spouse on the
basis of possible unjust enrichment of the negligent spouse). "The fact that [one
spouse] may decide to give the proceeds of the judgment to [the other spouse] is not a
reason to deny ... compensation in all cases." Id. at 253.
76. E.g., Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 497, 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1954) (if
disabled spouse was negligent, other spouse could recover for property damage, but
not for loss of consortium); Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 845, 71 S.E.2d 355, 357-
58 (1952) (recovery for personal injuries is unaffected by contributory negligence of
spouse); see W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 74, at 489-90. Compare, e.g., Dunham v.
Kampman, 37 Colo. App. 233, 237, 547 P.2d 263, 266 (1975) (innocent wife can
recover fully from defendant for personal injuries where defendant was negligent and
husband was contributorily negligent), af'd en banc, 192 Colo. 448, 560 P.2d 91
(1977), with Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 483, 462 P.2d 589, 593-
94 (1969) (en banc) (innocent loss of consortium spouse denied recovery for loss of
consortium because disabled spouse was contributorily negligent). The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court has distinguished recovery for personal
injuries and property damage from loss of consortium. lvlaidman v. Stagg, 82 A.D.2d
299, 305-06, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (1981). The court said that personal injuries and
property damage are direct injuries, but loss of consortium is only an indirect injury.
Therefore, although the contributory negligence of a plaintiff's spouse is irrelevant to
recovery for personal injuries and property damage, the court held that it bars or
reduces recovery for loss of consortium. Id.
77. H. Clark, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 262. The exclusive remedy between spouses
for loss of consortium is divorce. Id. In 1969, the Supreme Court of Minnesota totally
abrogated interspousal immunity. Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173
N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969). In 1976, however, the same court held that the loss of
consortium spouse could not recover for loss of consortium from the disabled spouse
who negligently caused the loss. Plain v. Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 401-02, 240 N.W.2d
330, 332 (1976) (en bane). Between the spouses, the right to consortium is dependent
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reduce or bar recovery to prevent the defendant from paying an
amount in excess of his proportionate share. 78 Of the parties to the
action, however, the loss of consortium spouse is the least at fault. Any
allocation of costs, therefore, should favor this innocent spouse.79
The unfairness of a defendant paying an amount in excess of his
proportionate fault can be remedied by permitting the defendant to
sue the disabled spouse for contribution even though the disabled
spouse is not directly liable to the loss of consortium spouse.80 In an
analogous situation, for instance, the New York Court of Appeals held
in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 8' that although a negligent employer
was not directly liable to its employee for a work-related injury be-
cause of worker's compensation,8 2 the employer was indirectly liable:
on one spouse's voluntary rendition thereof. Id. at 401-02, 240 N.W.2d at 331-32.
Nevertheless, most states do permit recovery for loss of consortium where it is caused
by third parties: Third parties have a duty not to interfere with one spouse's right to
consortium. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
78. Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 436, 397 P.2d 529, 532 (1964) (en bane).
"Evidently the courts view with disfavor a contention that a third party should pay
all of the damages when the [disabled spouse's] own negligence was responsible for
some of them." Id. at 435, 397 P.2d at 531; see Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389,
1391 (Alaska 1979) (defendant pays amount proportionate to fault when award is
reduced); cf. Stull v. Ragsdale, 620 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Ark. 1981) (contributory
negligence of one parent in causing death of child is imputed to other parent because
negligent parent shares in recovery).
79. Tort law is usually based on fault. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 75, at 492-93.
In certain situations, as where one engages in an abnormally dangerous activity,
strict liability, that is, liability without fault, will be imposed. Id. at 494.
80. See Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26
(1979); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980) (en bane); cf. Perchell
v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (parental immunity
does not prevent defendant from receiving contribution from contributorily negligent
parent); Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1977) (interspousal immunity does
not prevent defendant who paid more than his proportionate share of personal
injuries damages from recovering from contributorily negligent spouse); Puller v.
Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 221, 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1955) (defendant entitled to contribu-
tion from spouse even though the plaintiff is precluded from enforcing judgment
against spouse). Most courts do not allow contribution if the person from whom
contribution is sought was not directly liable to the injured person. E.g., Short Line,
Inc. v. Perez, 238 A.2d 341, 343 (Del. 1968); Shonka v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1178,
1181-82, 152 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (1967). The Supreme Court of Iowa, holding that
a host-driver was not liable to a motor vehicle guest and was therefore not liable for
contribution to a third party, stated that such holding "is premised upon a commonly
accepted theory that the right to contribution among concurrent tort-feasors is
dependent upon common liability to an injured party." Id. at 1181, 152 N.W.2d at
244 (emphasis in original). The dissenting judge, who would have required contribu-
tion, noted that the majority opinion permits a concurrent tort-feasor to escape
liability if he has a defense unavailable to the other tort-feasor. Id. at 1183, 152
N.W.2d at 245 (Mason, J., dissenting). See generally 1 J. Dooley, Modem Tort Law
Liability & Litigation, § 26.22 (1977 & Supp. 1981) (requirement of common liabil-
ity for contribution); W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 50, at 309 (same).
81. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
82. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
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A manufacturer found liable to the employee for the same injury
could sue the employer for contribution. 3
Although a defendant may be unable to recover for an amount paid
in excess of fault if the disabled spouse is judgment proof, the negli-
gent defendant, rather than the innocent loss of consortium spouse,
should bear this cost. Admittedly, there may be fear that the disabled
spouse and the loss of consortium spouse will conspire to render the
negligent spouse judgment proof.8 4 Such collusion, however, should
be readily detectable. For example, if the negligent spouse transfers
funds to the loss of consortium spouse so as to appear judgment proof,
such a transfer should leave a tangible, discoverable trail. 85 More-
over, neither the threat of possible collusion nor the costs of discovery
justify a general rule denying the innocent spouse full recovery.80
The net effect of allowing the loss of consortium spouse to recover
fully from a defendant who then partially recovers from the disabled
spouse is a transfer of funds between spouses. If the loss of consortium
spouse and the disabled spouse in fact have a family exchequer, the
mere transfer of funds has the same result as an initial reduction in the
award.87 If there is no family exchequer, however, there has been a
more equitable allocation of damages. Moreover, even if there is a
family fund, insurance of the disabled spouse may result in full recov-
ery for both spouses, with the defendant paying only a proportionate
share.8 In any event, liability for the injury is more equitably allo-
83. Id. at 152-53, 282 N.E.2d at 294-95, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.
84. Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435, 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964) (en banc);
cf. Interspousal Immunity Rule and the Effect of Liability Insurance in Automobile
Accidents, 11 S.D. L. Rev. 144, 149-50 (1966) (fear of collusion with respect to
interspousal suits) [hereinafter cited as Interspousal Immunity].
85. Cf. D. Dobbs, supra note 31, § 4.3, at 240-44 (a constructive trust can be
imposed and property can be traced which equitably belongs to the plaintiff).
86. Cf. Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224, 228 (Me. 1973) (wife could sue
husband for premarital tort); Interspousal Immunity, supra note 84, at 149-50 (fear
of collusion against insurance companies by spouses does not justify refusal to abro-
gate interspousal immunity). "We do not have so little trust in the general ethics and
honor of our citizenry, and in the abilities of our judges and jurors to discern the
genuine from the spurious." 309 A.2d at 229.
87. For example, if the loss of consortium is valued at $10,000 and the allocation
of negligence is 70 % to the defendant and 30 % to the other spouse, the family fund is
affected as follows. If there is attribution of negligence, the spouse receives $7,000
from the defendant. The disabled spouse pays nothing. If there is no attribution, the
defendant pays $10,000 to the loss of consortium spouse and the other spouse pays
$3,000 as contribution to the defendant. The net amount received by the family
fund, therefore, is the same $7,000.
88. In comparative negligence states, initial reduction of the loss of consortium
award disregards the possibility of insurance. If the disabled spouse has insurance to
pay for his proportionate share of the loss of consortium damages should defendant
seek contribution, the net recovery of the disabled spouse and the loss of consortium
spouse will be greater whether or not the husband and wife have joint or separate
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cated to the negligent parties, and the innocent loss of consortium
spouse receives the just, full award.
D. Community Property States
Community property states characterize property of the husband
and wife either as separate-that is, owned by one spouse-or as
community-that is, owned by husband and wife together. 9 Gener-
ally, earnings of either spouse are community property 0 and certain
other property, such as a gift to one spouse, is separate property.9'
Damages may be difficult to characterize.9 2 If damages for loss of
funds. Because an insurance company has no right of subrogation against its insured,
see Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 225-26, 500 P.2d 945, 949 (1972),
the insurance company would not recover the amount it pays to the defendant. An
insurance policy is a contract. In re Estate of O'Neill, 143 Misc. 69, 72, 255 N.Y.S.
767, 771 (1932). The coverage of an insurance policy is, therefore, a question of
contractual interpretation. See id. An insurance policy may, however, be construed
as excluding recovery for loss of consortium suffered by the insured's spouse. Some
automobile liability policies, for example, exclude coverage for injuries to the policy-
holder. See R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 4.7(b), at 231, § 4.9(c), at 242
(1971). It has also been held that the maximum liability provision of an insurance
policy included both the disabling damages and the resulting loss of consortium
damages. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 221 Ga. 355, 357-58, 144
S.E.2d 723, 725 (1965); see R. Keeton, supra, § 5.9, at 330. Insurance has been a
factor in determining whether the individual identities of the husband and wife
should be recognized in other contexts. An argument against abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity, for instance, has been the possibility of collusion and fraud where
there is insurance coverage. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 122, at 868. The Supreme
Court of Florida has left the interspousal immunity intact. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.
2d 142, 145-46 (Fla. 1970). The Supreme Court of Minnesota, on the other hand, has
completely abrogated the immunity. Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173
N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969). Some courts have abrogated the immunity to a limited
extent. E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532-33 (1976);
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1974). Courts abrogating
the immunity believe the collusive and fraudulent suits can be separated from the
bona fide suits. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188-89, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972)
(en banc). See generally Interspousal Immunity, supra note 84, at 149-50 (discussion
of collusion in insurance cases).
89. Fuller v. Ferguson, 26 Cal. 546, 565-66 (1864); Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392,
401, 247 S.W. 828, 832 (1923); W. de Funiak & M. Vaughn, Principles of Commu-
nity Property § 1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1971). The community property states are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. W.
Reppy & W. de Funiak, Community Property in the United States v (1975).
90. W. Reppy & W. de Funiak, supra note 89, at 1. "The crux of a community
property system . .. is shared ownership by husband . .. and wife ... of acquisi-
tions earned by either or both during marriage." Id.
91. W. de Funiak & M. Vaughn, supra note 89, § 1, at 2.
92. See id., § 82; W. Reppy & W. de Funiak, supra note 89, at 170-210; cJ.
Horowitz, Conflict of Law Problems in Community Property (pt. 2), 11 Wash. L.
Rev. 212, 229-30 (1936) (damages for pain and suffering are not earned and should
be the separate property of the injured spouse).
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consortium are deemed community property, a reduction of or bar to
the award based on the contributory negligence of the disabled spouse
is reasonable because, as potential co-owner of such recovery, a spouse
should not be permitted to profit from his negligence.03 The trend in
community property states, however, is to consider the nature of the
injuries when characterizing damages.9 4 Damages for an individual
injury are considered separate property while those for an injury to
the spousal community are community property.95 As has been dis-
cussed, loss of consortium is an individual injury. 96 The defendant
interferes with a separate right of the loss of consortium spouse and
the computation of damages measures the loss suffered by that spouse;
it does not measure the "community loss."9  If both spouses have
suffered a loss of consortium, there are two distinct causes of action. 98
93. E.g., Levy v. New Orleans & N.E. R. Co., 21 So. 2d 155, 156 (La. Ct. App.
1945) (per curiam); Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 108, 323 P.2d 700, 704 (1958);
cf. Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Ala. 1979) (loss of consortium award
reduced in non-community property state when disabled spouse was contributorily
negligent because couple are an economic unit); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435-
36, 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964) (en bane) (same). If loss of consortium damages are
characterized as community property, the loss of consortium spouse and the disabled
spouse jointly own the proceeds and the possibility of the husband and wife having
separate funds does not exist: The law imposes a family treasury on such funds, See
Silvestri v. Hurlburt, 26 Ariz. App. 243, 244, 547 P.2d 514, 515 (1976); W. Reppy &
W. de Funiak, supra note 89, at 197.
94. Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 18, 539 P.2d 566, 570 (1974).
The Supreme Court of Idaho "believe[s] the correct concept is first to consider the
nature of the right or interest invaded or harmed by the negligence of a defendant,
and based on a determination of the nature of this right, then to characterize the
damages recovered in relation to the right violated." Id.; accord Jurek v. Jurek, 124
Ariz. 596, 598, 606 P.2d 812, 814 (1980) (en bane); see Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M.
483, 494, 245 P.2d 826, 832 (1952); W. de Funiak & M. Vaughn, supra note 89, § 82.
95. Jurek v. Jurek, 124 Ariz. 596, 598, 606 P.2d 812, 814-15 (1980) (en bane)
(compensation for personal injuries should be separate property); Rogers v. Yellow-
stone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 20, 539 P.2d 566, 572 (1974) (personal injuries damages
are separate property; lost earnings are community in character).
96. See supra notes 45, 69, 72. The Supreme Court of Texas, holding that either
spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium, disagreed that loss of consortium
should not be a cognizable injury despite the defendant's argument that there would
be a possibility of double recovery. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex.
1978). The court noted that "it cannot be said that the character of the deprived
spouse's recovery for loss of consortium is community property." Id. In 1980, a
federal court applying Texas state law similarly characterized loss of consortium
damages as separate property. Lester v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1033, 1041
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
97. See, e.g., Lester v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
("this court awards . . .$50,000.00 for his loss of consortium" (emphasis added));
Whittlesey v, Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978) ("Each spouse recovers for
losses peculiar to the injury sustained by each of them.").
98. See Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); cf. Bartalo
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 584, 124 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374-75 (1975)
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Community property states, therefore, should treat the award as
separate property and should not require the reduction or bar of the
loss of consortium award because of the contributory negligence of the
disabled spouse.99
III. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Because they designate the loss of consortium action derivative,
many courts subject the loss of consortium claim to the procedural
rules of the disabling injury claim.100 Anomalously, a number of
courts that designate the action derivative do not require this result. '0
This inconsistency reflects the ambiguity inherent in the "derivative"
label and the need to distinguish between the loss of consortium injury
and action.
A. Statute of Limitations
If the statute of limitations runs on the claim of the disabled spouse,
the claim of the loss of consortium spouse is often automatically
barred.10 2 It is reasoned that because the loss of consortium action is
(spouses' complaint could not be amended to include loss of each other's consortium
because each spouse's claim for loss of consortium is separate).
99. De Funiak and Vaughn do not agree. W. de Funiak & M. Vaughn, supra
note 89, § 83, at 205. They focus, however, on only one element of loss of consor-
tium: loss of services. Damages for lost earnings are properly deemed community
property because a basis of the community property principle is that the husband and
wife are a partnership as to earnings of either spouse, even if one works inside the
home. See W. Reppy & W. de Funiak, supra note 89, at 1. Loss of consortium,
however, includes emotional elements, which are individual losses, such as loss of
companionship, affection and sexual relations, and therefore it should be character-
ized as separate property. Although California had not deemed loss of consortium
damages separate property, a California court refused to reduce the loss of consor-
tium award by the contributory negligence of the disabled spouse. Lantis v. Condon,
95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (1979). The defendant would be
permitted to sue the disabled spouse for contribution, and the disabled spouse must
first use his separate property to pay his proportionate share before using community
property. Id. at 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
100. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 892; see, e.g., Sisemore v. Neal, 236
Ark. 574, 577, 367 S.W.2d 417, 418 (1963); Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Supp.
286, 290-91, 408 A.2d 673, 675 (Super. Ct. 1979); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284
Minn. 508, 513, 170 N.W.2d 865, 869 (1969); Hunter v. School Dist., 97 Wis. 2d
435, 447, 293 N.W.2d 515, 521 (1980).
101. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 892-93; supra note 54 and accompa-
nying text.
102. W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 125, at 892; e.g., Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d
89, 93 (8th Cir. 1961); Francis v. Pan Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252,
1257 (D. Del. 1975); Kolar v. City of Chicago, 12 Ill. App. 3d 887, 890, 299 N.E.2d
479, 481 (1973). Under this rule, the loss of consortium claim is automatically
governed by the statute of limitations governing the claim of the disabled spouse, and
there is a simultaneous running of the statute on both claims. When the Supreme
Court of Minnesota found that a personal injuries claim was barred by the statute of
limitations, it held that the loss of consortium claim was also barred because, as a
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derivative, it should be disallowed when the primary action is
barred. 03 The loss of consortium action, however, is a separate action
that is merely based on a derivative injury. 10 4 A court should therefore
determine which statute of limitations applies to the loss of consor-
tium claim and when the statute started to run thereon. 05 Thus,
although a spouse injured by the negligence of a doctor had a claim
for malpractice subject to a one-year statute of limitations, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio correctly ruled that his spouse's separate loss of
consortium claim was not for malpractice and, therefore, was subject
to a different statute of limitations. 06
Additionally, the initial injury and loss of consortium injury do not
necessarily occur simultaneously. 07 For example, if the loss of consor-
derivative action, "it is subject to the same statute-of-limitations considerations."
Anderson v. Lutheran Deaconess Hosp., 257 N.W.2d 561, 562 & n.1 (Minn. 1977). It
is, of course, possible that the disabling injury and loss of consortium will occur at the
same time, see Berry v. Myrick, 260 S.C. 68, 69-70, 194 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1973), and
that the statute of limitations governing the claim of the disabled spouse will be the
proper one to govern the loss of consortium claim. Under such circumstances, if the
claim of the disabled spouse is barred, the loss of consortium claim should also be
barred. See Baughman v. Bolinger, 485 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-04 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
103. E.g., Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1961); Anderson v.
Lutheran Deaconess Hosp., 257 N.W.2d 561, 562 n.1 (Minn. 1977); of. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684, 686 (D.C. 1976) (defenses against
insured good against insurer); American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind. App.
99, 106, 278 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1972) (insurance company has rights no greater than
insured). Insurance subrogation is a derivative action. "[B]ecause the insurer's ...
claim is based on the [insured's] rights, the ... complaint must be brought before the
[insured's] action against the [defendant] has been barred by the statute of limita-
tions." 3 J. Moore, supra note 35, § 14.09, at 14-248 (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152,
156-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (1979); supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
105. See Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Corpman v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 234, 169
N.E.2d 14, 15 (1960); Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 111, 124 S.E.2d 781, 785-86
(1962).
106. Corpman v. Boyer, 171 Ohio St. 233, 237-38, 169 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1960).
Many states have statutes of limitations governing bodily injuries. E.g., Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.5805 (1968 & Supp. 1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Page
1981). Although loss of consortium is primarily an emotional injury, some courts
apply such a statute where it governs the claim of the disabled spouse because of the
derivative nature of loss of consortium or because the loss of consortium injury is
deemed merely consequential damages of the claim of the disabled spouse. E.g.,
Tollett v. Mashburn, 291 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1961); Kolar v. City of Chicago, 12
Ill. App. 3d 887, 890-91, 299 N.E.2d 479, 481-82 (1973). Similarly, when the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a claim of the disabled spouse was timely
because a new statute of limitations could not apply retroactively, it stated that the
loss of consortium claim was likewise not barred because loss of consortium is a
derivative claim. Hunter v. School Dist., 97 Wis. 2d 435, 447, 293 N.W.2d 515, 521
(1980).
107. In some instances, the disabling injuries do not immediately prevent the
disabled spouse from rendering consortium. See Baughman v. Bolinger, 485 F. Supp.
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tium spouse does not suffer the loss until one year after the other
spouse suffered the disabling injuries, the statute of limitations should
start to run at that later date.' 0  "To hold that the statute of limita-
tions governing [the] right to sue for loss of consortium was running
during years in which [the loss of consortium spouse] fully enjoyed
that consortium would be to exalt fiction and avoid undeniable real-
ity." 09 Because a statute of limitations generally starts to run when a
plaintiff can maintain an action to enforce a claim,u) the statute of
limitations for loss of consortium should not start to run until there has
in fact been such a loss."'
B. Amendments to the Disabled Spouse's Complaint
Once it has been determined that the statute of limitations has run
on the loss of consortium claim, there is some question whether a
timely filed complaint of the disabled spouse may be amended to
include the claim of the loss of consortium spouse."12  Federal and
similar state rules of civil procedure '3 are liberal with regard to
permitting the amendment of pleadings."14 Under these rules, timely
1000, 1003 (S.D. Ohio 1980). One interpretation of the applicability of a statute of
limitations resulted in the statute expiring on the loss of consortium claim before
discovery of the disabling injury. The statute started to run on the claim of the
disabled spouse upon discovery. See Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85,
88-91, 351 N.E.2d 479, 482-83 (1976).
108. Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 93, 351 N.E.2d 479, 485
(1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
109. Baughman v. Bolinger, 485 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
110. Andreaggi v. Relis, 171 N.J. Super. 203, 235-36, 408 A.2d 455, 472 (Ch. Div.
1979); Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 111, 124 S.E.2d 781, 785 (1962); Wisconsin
Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 323, 291
N.W.2d 825, 829-30 (1980).
111. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 429, 28 N.W.2d 530, 537 (1947); Brown v.
Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 111, 124 S.E.2d 781, 785 (1962); see Goodman v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 1976) (New Jersey law would require
"separate determination of the date of his discovery" of loss of consortium before the
statute of limitations starts to run), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
112. Compare Hoch v. Venture Enters., 473 F. Supp. 541, 542 (D.V.I. 1979)
(amendment allowed), with Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 532-34,
124 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374-75 (1975) (amendment not allowed).
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 203(e) (McKinney 1972);
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03.
114. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). "The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Id. Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules is
concerned with the relation back of amendments. "'Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
1982] 1365
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
pleadings may subsequently be amended to state a new cause of action
on which the statute of limitations has run if the information in the
original pleadings provides adequate notice of the new cause of
action." 5 Thus, it has been held that the disabled spouse can amend
his complaint to join the claim of the loss of consortium spouse because
loss of consortium, even if viewed as a separate cause of action, arises
out of the same conduct that caused the disabling injuries: "0 The
original complaint serves to provide adequate notice. " 7
In other states that permit an amendment to relate back only if it
does not state a new cause of action,"' plaintiffs are required to set
forth all causes of action against a defendant before the statutes of
limitations run.1 9 Some of these states, however, characterizing the
back to the date of the original pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see 6 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 41, § 1496, at 482-83; id. § 1497, at 498-99.
115. 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 41, § 1471, at 360; id. § 1497, at 499-
502.
116. Hoch v. Venture Enters., 473 F. Supp. 541. 542 (D.V.I. 1979); Hockett v.
American Airlines, 357 F. Supp. 1343, 1347-48 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Grubaugh v. City of
St. Johns, 82 Mich. App. 282, 285-86, 266 N.W.2d 791, 793 (1978); cf. Rivera v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 102 Misc. 2d 727, 728-29, 424 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(amendment to add parent's claim for loss of child's services relates back); Osborne
Enters., Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 561 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)
(amendment to add corporation's subsidiary relates back).
117. Hoch v. Venture Enters., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 541, 542 (D.V.I. 1979). "[T]he
loss of consortium claim is based upon the same allegations of negligence contained in
[the personal injury spouse's] complaint." Id. The amendment can relate back even
though the loss of consortium spouse is a new plaintiff. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 41, § 1501, at 523-24; id. at 170 (Supp. 1982).
118. E.g., Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 532-34, 124 Cal. Rptr.
370, 374-75 (1975); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 167 Conn. 284, 285, 355 A.2d
253, 254 (1974) (per curiam); Cox v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 360 So. 2d 8, 10
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The Supreme Court of Alaska, permitting the personal
injury spouse to amend her complaint to include the loss of consortium spouse,
reasoned that the "consortium claim was based upon the same conduct, transaction,
and occurrence relied upon in the original pleading [and that the defendant] had
ample notice of the cause of action." Jakoski v. Holland, 520 P.2d 569, 576 (Alaska
1974). The court, however, stressed that the "amendment here did not state a new
claim for relief but did relate back to the date of the original complaint." Id.; cf.
Wallace v. Shaffer, 155 W. Va. 132, 137-38, 181 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1971) (amend-
ment to complaint alleging alienation of affection to include claim for interference
with attempts to reconcile a marriage relationship related back).
119. E.g., Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533, 124 Cal. Rptr.
370, 374-75 (1975); School Bd. v. Surette, 394 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Cox v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 360 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
The reason for requiring a plaintiff to assert all his causes of action before the statute
of limitations runs was set forth by the Cox court, which denied a plaintiff leave to
add his own claim for personal injuries to his complaint that sought relief for the
wrongful death of his parent. "[W]e do not see that this rule should be so liberally
construed as to allow a plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations on the
plaintiff's separate cause of action which could have been asserted by separate suit
brought at any time within the statutory period." Id. at 10. An interesting issue is
which rule a federal court must apply in a diversity suit if the state is still using the
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loss of consortium action as derivative, permit the disabled spouse to
amend his complaint to include the claim of the loss of consortium
spouse. 120 As one court noted, permitting a loss of consortium claim to
relate back to the disabling injury action ignores that "'[a]lthough a
claim for loss of consortium is a derivative cause of action, it neverthe-
less is a separate action."' 2 ' Despite its anomalous characterization of
the action as derivative, this court correctly recognized that the deriv-
ative loss of consortium injury is the subject of a separate action.
Although liberal amendment of pleadings is the modern rule, the
restrictive rule adhered to in some jurisdictions should be consistently
applied. In these jurisdictions, the loss of consortium claim should not
be permitted to be tacked on to the claim of the disabled spouse.
C. Prior Adjudication of the Claim of the Disabled Spouse
There is a split in authority as to whether adjudication of the claim
of the disabled spouse precludes the loss of consortium spouse from
"separate cause of action" standard. The United States Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue. Forum shopping would be encouraged if a loss of consortium
spouse would be barred in state court, but would not be barred in federal court. The
Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. sought to prevent forum shopping. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938). Authorities are generally of the view that the
federal rule should apply irrespective of the state law. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil
Procedure § 5.7, at 167 n. 10 (2d ed. 1977): 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 41, §
1503, at 536. A federal rule of civil procedure is valid if it *'really regulates proce-
dure." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). The First Circuit has ruled
that determining if an amendment relates back produces a substantive effect and,
when the state rule conflicted with the federal rule, the state rule governed. Marshall
v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1974). "Paradoxically, Rule 15 seems, basi-
cally, drawn to avoid a substantive effect so far as statutes of limitations are con-
cerned, so as not to extend the statute under the guise of permitting an amend-
ment ...... Id. at 44. Determination of the proper statute of limitations is a
substantive issue. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (state
law should govern in diversity case if it conflicts with the federal rule).
120. Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Supp. 286, 290-92, 408 A.2d 673, 675 (Super.
Ct. 1979). The Allen court, noting that one line of cases allows the loss of consortium
amendment to relate back, while the other does not, said that "[t]he nub of the
distinction between those two groups of cases is whether the claim for loss of consor-
tium in the tort action is deemed to be a new or different cause of action." Id., accord
Jakoski v. Holland, 520 P.2d 569, 576 (Alaska 1974). What the Allen court failed to
recognize is that the application of the liberal federal rule does not turn on whether a
new cause of action is stated in the amendment. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 41, § 1497, at 499-502. A California court did not allow the disabled spouse to
amend her complaint to include the loss of consortium spouse after the statute of
limitations had run. The court noted that although loss of consortium is "derivative
because it does not arise unless his wife has sustained a personal injury, . . . his claim
is not for her personal injuries but for the separate and independent loss he sus-
tained." Bartalo v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533, 124 Cal. Rptr. 370,
374 (1975); accord Shelton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 66, 81, 128 Cal. Rptr.
454, 464 (1976).
121. Daniels v. Weiss, 385 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).
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separately litigating the loss of consortium claim or the negligence
issue. 122 Because loss of consortium is a separate cause of action,
brought by a separate party, the majority of courts do not so restrict
the loss of consortium action. 123 The marriage relationship is not a
sufficient nexus to create the necessary privity.124  A minority of
122. Jones v. Beasley, 476 F. Supp. 116, 118-19 (M.D. Ga. 1979), see Husband
and Wife: Collateral Estoppel in the Consortium Action, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 267
(1974). Compare Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss. 611, 621-22, 57 So. 2d 476,
481 (1952) (no preclusion from litigating), with Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 367
S.W.2d 417, 417-19 (1963) (collateral estoppel applied). Res judicata operates to bar
a party from litigating a claim (claim preclusion). F. James & G. Hazard, supra note
119, § 11.3, at 532. Collateral estoppel operates to prevent a party from litigating an
issue (issue preclusion). Id. There is some confusion over the proper use of these
terms. Some courts apparently use them interchangeably. One federal court, for
example, deciding that adverse adjudication of the initially injured spouse precluded
the loss of consortium spouse from litigating, cited indiscriminately to cases applying
or not applying both res judicata and collateral estoppel. Jones v. Beasley, 476 F.
Supp. 116, 118-19 (M.D. Ga. 1979) (citing, inter alia, Bitsos v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
350 F. Supp. 850, 853 (D.S.D. 1972) (res judicata applied); Kraut v. Cleveland Ry.,
132 Ohio St. 125, 126-27, 5 N.E.2d 324, 325 (1936) (res judicata not applied); Laws
v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876. 878 (Okla. 1973) (collateral estoppel applied); Wolff v. Du
Puis, 233 Or. 317, 323, 378 P.2d 707, 710 (1963) (en bane) (collateral estoppel not
applied), overruled on other grounds en banc, Bahler v. Fletcher, 256 Or. 329, 479
P.2d 329 (1970)). Collateral estoppel is the appropriate term because the initial
injury action and the loss of consortium action are two separate claims. See F. James
& C. Hazard, supra note 119, § 11.4, at 532-33, § 11.29, at 590. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that "[sjome litigants-those who never appeared in a
prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They
have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due
process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the
identical issue which stands squarely against their position." Blonder-Tongue Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (citations omit-
ted). Parties who are neither the same parties of, nor in privity with the parties of,
the preceding action may not be collaterally estopped: "It is a violation of due process
for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and
therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citations omitted). The Restatement of Judgments takes
the position that the loss of consortium spouse should be collaterally estopped from
litigating issues that the disabled spouse has already litigated. Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 93(2) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976). The Restatement notes that the
difference in those jurisdictions that preclude litigation and those that do not is based
on the characterization of the loss of consortium as a separate or derivative claim. Id.
§ 93 comment c & illustrations 3-4.
123. Jones v. Beasley, 476 F. Supp. 116, 118 (M.D. Ga.1979); e.g., Russ Transp.,
Inc. v. Jones, 104 Ga. App. 612, 613-14, 122 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1961); Palmer v.
Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss. 611, 618-21, 57 So. 2d 476, 478-80 (1952); Womach v.
City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 491, 100 S.W. 443, 450 (1907); Kraut v. Cleveland
Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 126-27, 5 N.E.2d 324, 325 (1936); Wolff v. Du Puis, 233 Or.
317, 320-23, 378 P.2d 707, 709-10 (1963), overruled on other grounds en banc,
Bahler v. Fletcher, 256 Or. 384, 479 P.2d 329 (1970).
124. E.g., Palmer v.Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss. 611, 618-20, 57 So. 2d 476, 479-
80 (1952); Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 127, 5 N.E.2d 324, 325 (1936).
The First Circuit has held that litigation of an issue by one spouse does not collater-
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courts, although generally agreeing that marriage does not create
privity for other types of actions,' 25 apply collateral estoppel12 or res
judicata 27 to loss of consortium actions solely as a consequence of its
derivative characterization. Under this minority view, if the spouses
are in an accident and the disabled spouse loses an action for injuries,
the other spouse is precluded from suing for loss of consortium, but is
permitted to sue for other injuries incurred in the same accident.'
One federal court, applying state law, felt compelled to preclude
the loss of consortium spouse from litigating.12 Because the applica-
ble state law designated loss of consortium a derivative action, "it
follow[ed] that the ...claim [was] dependent upon the validity of
the [disabled] spouse's cause of action."' 3 0 The fallacy of the minority
rule is its failure to recognize that there are two separate claims.' '
The loss of consortium spouse does not seek recovery for the injuries of
the disabled spouse, but rather seeks relief for the separate loss of
consortium injury. The practice of attaching the uncertain "deriva-
ally estop the other spouse from litigating this issue in her personal injuries claim.
Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Doiron, 170 F.2d 206, 209 (Ist Cir. 1948). "The respective
causes of action of appellee and his wife were entirely distinct and independent,
though they arose out of the same accident." Id. at 208.
125. F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 119, § 11.29, at 589. In these minority
jurisdictions, "if a husband sues for his own injuries and loses the action, that
judgment precludes the wife from suing for her loss of consortium... resulting from
his injury; but the judgment does not preclude the wife from suing for bodily injuries
to herself suffered in the very same accident." Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Jones v. Beasley, 476 F. Supp. 116, 119 (M.D. Ga. 1979): e.g.. Thill v.
Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 515-16, 170 N.W.2d 865, 870-71 (1969); Laws
v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876, 878 (Okla. 1973). Similarly, a few courts have stated that
settlement of the claim of the disabled spouse operates to bar the loss of consortium
claim. Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 494, 408 A.2d 260, 264 (1979);
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 508, 239 N.E.2d 897, 903,
293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312 (1968). The disabled spouse cannot recover for the loss of
consortium and that spouse's unilateral decision to settle the separate injury claim
should not affect the ability of the loss of consortium spouse to recover in a separate
action. See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978).
127. E.g., Bitsos v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 850, 853 (D.S.D. 1972);
Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 574-77, 367 S.W.2d 417. 417-18 (1963).
128. F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 119, § 11.29, at 589.
129. Bitsos v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 850, 852 (D.S.D. 1972) (constru-
ing South Dakota law).
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 45, 52 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas, dismissing a loss of consortium claim because the disabled spouse had an adverse
judgment on his claim, commented that "logic unquestionably supports the view
here taken. To permit a second suit would authorize 't-wo bites' and would have the
actual effect of rendering the prior judgment, wherein [the defendant] was exoner-
ated of liability, a nullity." Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574,1577, 367 S.W.2d 417, 418
(1963). There are, however, two claims and the judgment is, therefore, not a nullity.
The defendant is protected from liability to the disabled spouse who has had his day
in court.
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tive" label to both the injury and the action should not be permitted to
cloak the distinct nature of the loss of consortium claim, and does not
justify mechanically applying the preclusive procedural rules of the
initial action to the separate loss of consortium action.
CONCLUSION
The early common-law legal identity of husband and wife has long
ceased to exist. Today each spouse has a separately enforceable and
compensable right to consortium. By resorting to the ambiguous "de-
rivative" label or to legal fictions of marital unity, however, courts
have circumvented this separateness and retained a link of the chain
that once inextricably bound spouses. The current recognition of the
husband and wife as two individuals, each possessing separate rights
and duties, demands treatment of loss of consortium as a separate and
fully enforceable action.
Jo-Anne M. Baio
